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Al Qaeda works for the CIA..why shouldn't I believe this?
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Pietro_Mercurios
Heuristically Challenged
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PostPosted: 27-05-2007 01:14    Post subject: More on that Cut 'n' Paste Orgy, later! Reply with quote

"Outsourcing", "Franchising", 'Cellular Networks'? confused
Quote:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Central_Intelligence_Agency

Central Intelligence Agency

...


Afghanistan

Often cited as one of the American intelligence community's biggest mistakes was the training, arming, supplying and supporting of the Mujahedeen (Islamist fighters) in Afghanistan, initiated under Carter and greatly expanded under Reagan, as American proxy soldiers against the Marxist regime and later the Soviet intervention. Part of the Mujahedeen trained by the CIA later became the core cadre of Osama bin Laden's Al Qaeda Islamist organization. Zbigniew Brzezinski, the National Security Advisor under President Carter, has discussed U.S. military involvement in Afghanistan in several magazines.

... The CIA worked extensively with Pakistan's ISI throughout the Afghan-Soviet War, and works with this agency closely for the War on Terror.

...

Quote:
http://www.grailwerk.com/docs/nytimes10.htm

May 25, 2003

'Charlie Wilson's War': Arming the Mujahedeen

By DAVID JOHNSTON

For most of his 24-year career in the House of Representatives, Charles Wilson was known for his abiding fondness for hot tubs, women and Scotch whiskey. His friends at the Central Intelligence Agency said, only partly in jest, that the Texas Democrat's reputation as a roue provided a perfect cover for his great passion, the mujahedeen rebellion against the Soviet Union's occupation of Afghanistan. During the 1980's, Wilson used his seat on a military appropriations subcommittee to steer billions of dollars in secret funding to the C.I.A. to funnel arms to the mujahedeen.

So it was hardly a surprise after the Soviets' humiliating withdrawal in 1989 that the C.I.A.'s spymasters invited Wilson out to celebrate at the agency's headquarters at Langley, Va. On a large movie screen in an auditorium at the George Bush Center for Intelligence flashed a huge quotation from Pakistan's president, Gen. Mohammad Zia ul-Haq, who had willingly allowed the C.I.A.'s arms pipeline to flow through his country. Zia credited Wilson with the defeat of the Russians in Afghanistan with the words, ''Charlie did it.''

In ''Charlie Wilson's War,'' George Crile, a veteran ''60 Minutes'' producer, recounts the story of Wilson's personal journey from the East Texas Bible Belt to Congress, where he became the secret patron of what was then the largest covert operation in C.I.A. history. Of course, the American effort to arm the mujahedeen must be measured against recent events like the Sept. 11 attacks. The Qaeda hijackings underscored how the American-financed war against the Soviets in Afghanistan helped create a political vacuum filled by the Taliban and Islamic extremists, who turned their deadly terrorism back against the United States.

Moreover, there was concern within intelligence circles about the hundreds of Stinger missile systems that the C.I.A. supplied to the mujahedeen forces in the 1980's to combat the Russians' most fearful weapon, the Mi-24 Hind helicopter gunship. After the Soviet withdrawal, the agency embarked on a costly buyback program, but most of the missiles remained unaccounted for. American military commanders feared they might be used during the war in Afghanistan that followed the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon.

But in its time there was little dispute that the covert war was one of the most successful C.I.A. operations ever undertaken, a deadly confrontation conducted through a surrogate with the Soviet empire in its death throes.* Only a handful of people in the government knew that behind the Afghan resistance was a pirate's crew of misfits, most notably Charlie Wilson himself, whom Crile affectionately profiles as the lawmaker who widened the war through a series of backroom deals on Capitol Hill that were never publicly disclosed or debated.

For most of his years in the House until he retired in 1996, Wilson rarely spoke on the House floor and was never associated with any of the great legislative issues of his day. He infuriated colleagues like Pat Schroeder, a Colorado Democrat, by calling her ''Babycakes,'' and acknowledged when he announced his retirement that ''at times I've been a reckless and rowdy public servant.'' But Crile asserts that Wilson's flaky public persona concealed a fervent anti-Communist and deeply ambitious politician, who built a power base in Congress that he used to pour money into the Afghan cause. In return for voting for military contracts in his colleagues' districts, Wilson won votes from his fellow lawmakers for the mujahedeen.

From a few million dollars in the early 1980's, support for the resistance grew to about $750 million a year by the end of the decade. The decisions were made in secret by Wilson and other lawmakers on the appropriations committee. To help make his case, Wilson exploited one of the decade's scandals, the Iran-contra affair, arguing that Democrats who were voting to cut off funding for the contras in Nicaragua could demonstrate their willingness to stand up to the Soviet empire by approving more money for the Afghan fighters.

''Charlie Wilson's War'' is a behind-the-scenes chronicle of a program that is still largely classified. Crile does not provide much insight into his reporting methods, but the book appears to be based on interviews with a number of the principals. The result is a vivid narrative, though a reader may wonder how much of this story is true in exactly the way Crile presents it. Still, few people who remember Wilson's years in Washington would discount even the wildest tales.

Crile recounts with relish Wilson's partying. There are many anecdotes of his overseas travels, first-class at taxpayers' expense, accompanied by former beauty queens who seem to pop up at events in conservative Islamic countries wearing skintight jumpsuits. In one odd moment, according to Crile, Wilson brought his own belly dancer from Texas to Cairo to entertain the Egyptian defense minister, who was secretly supplying the mujahedeen with millions of rounds of ammunition for the AK-47's that the C.I.A. was smuggling into Afghanistan. Her sultry dancing went far beyond the prudish norms of Cairo, but delighted the powerful minister.

Crile tells us that Wilson enjoyed driving to distraction a succession of C.I.A. officials as he prodded the agency to supply the fighters with increasingly more lethal weapons. The agency bureaucrats were content with a modest program designed to bleed the Soviets, whereas Wilson envisioned a war that the mujahedeen could win. As the money for the war began to flow, the C.I.A. put one of its own misfits in charge of the operation, Gust Avrakotos. He formed a small band of agency officers who quickly got behind the war in Afghanistan. Tens of thousands of automatic weapons, antitank guns, even satellite intelligence maps, redrawn in the form of crude maps that might have been penned by the mujahedeen themselves -- all of it was carried across Pakistan's border into Afghanistan on the backs of mules procured by the C.I.A. from as far away as the Tennessee hill country.

On Feb. 15, 1989, Gen. Boris Gromov, commander of the Soviets' 40th Army, walked across Friendship Bridge as the last Russian to leave Afghanistan. The C.I.A. cable from the Islamabad station to Langley said, ''We won.'' Wilson's own note to Avrakotos said simply, ''We did it.''

David Johnston, a senior Washington correspondent for The Times, covers terrorism and national security issues.

Copyright 2003 The New York Times Company
*Emphasis mine

Quote:
http://www.hartford-hwp.com/archives/27d/084.html

Date: Tue, 25 Aug 98 16:37:38 CDT
From: Ralph McGehee <rmcgehee@igc.org>
Subject: CIABASE: Background to Terrorism
Organization: Institute for Global Communications
Article: 41837
To: undisclosed-recipients:;;@chumbly.math.missouri.edu
Message-ID: <bulk.29602.19980826181538@chumbly.math.missouri.edu>


A Background to Terrorism
By Ralph McGehee, CIABASE, 25 August 1998

Afghanistan, Pakistan, Egypt, 80-96 Blowback of CIA ops. CIA spent more than $3 billion dollars in 80s to train and fund the Afghan resistance—most venomously anti-Western—they form core of an international net of Islamic militants. CIA weaponry went to fundamentalist Gulbaddin Hekmatyar, one of the most anti-western leaders and until recently president of Afghanistan. His allies included Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman, serving life in the U.S. for urban terrorism. Rami Ahmed Yousef, man accused of planning the bombing of the World Trade Center was trained in Afghanistan. The terrorist net has targeted Washington's most pivotal Islamic allies—claiming responsibility for the first terrorist attack in Saudi Arabia and some of the worst attacks in Pakistan. Christian Science Monitor 11/1/96 18

Middle East, Afghanistan, Pakistan, 81-92 Support for Afghan members of, Ikhwan, a frequently violent Muslim brotherhood. Saddam Hussein of Iraq and Khadafi of Libya also supported more fanatic factions of Afghan Mujahaddin—but largest contributor of Gulbaddin Hekmatyar came from CIA. Huge amounts of U.S. aid also to Ahmed Shah Masood of Rabbani's Jamiat-I-Islami, both longtime advocates of pan-Islam. Lohbeck, K. (1993). Holy War, Unholy Victory 171

Afghanistan, Pakistan, USSR, 80-90 In 1987 the broad percentages of material allocated to the Islamic fundamentalist parties was between 67-73 per cent. Allocations to the parties were: Hekmatyar 18-20 per cent, Rabbani 18-19 per cent, Sayaf 17-18 per cent, Khalis 13-15 per cent, Nabi 13-15 per cent, Gailani 10-11 per cent, and Mujaddadi 3-5 per cent. Mohammad Yousai & Adkin, M. (1992). The Bear Trap: Afghanistan's Untold Story 97,105,215

Afghanistan, Pakistan, 80-93 U.S. created a monster by supporting a rebellion based on religious zealotry. Several of those involved in World Trade Center bombing or plans to attack other targets participated in the Afghan rebellion as recruiters, trainers, or fighters. Abdel Rahman was reportedly a prolific recruiter per reports from Cairo. An Afghan link extends as well to a number of accused terrorists in Egypt, Algeria, and other Arab countries. Through Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence organization (ISI), CIA provided weapons, money and training for Afghan insurgents. Dispute over giving Stinger missiles. Morton Abramowitz, Director of the State Department's INR, now president of the Carneige Endowment for International Peace, was the leading advocate for supplying Stingers. CIA now seeking $55 million to purchase missiles that showing up on black market. Pakistan's ISI favored Hekmatyar—Pakistan agent for years—he now is prime minister of Afghanistan. Peshawar was center for insurgency/extremists and now they looking for new targets—such as the pro-West government in Egypt. Washington Times 7/26/93 a1,13

Afghanistan, 79-90 Mohammad Yousaf & Adkin, M. (1992). The Bear Trap: Afghanistan's Untold Story. London, England: Leo Cooper. The book outlines CIA's support operation for the Mujaheddin in Afghanistan via Pakistan's Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI), Pakistan's CIA. ISI funneled 70 per cent of all material aid—money, uniforms, weapons, including Stinger missiles, and demolitions—to radical Islamic fundamentalists. Now radical Islamic fundamentalism is our major problem. CIABASE report, Crisis of Democracy. 5/1/95

Afghanistan, Pakistan, 80-94 Covert CIA program to buy back U.S. Stinger missiles distributed to rebel forces in 80s plagued by failures, miscalculations and wasted money. Congress authorized more than $65 million for op over last 3 years. Despite the millions, CIA has recovered only a fraction and does not know who controls remaining weapons. Missiles supplied by CIA have turned up in Iran, Qatar and North Korea. Op turned into a fish market “CIA unable to recover most of the missiles.” One effort failed when Pakistani officials stormed into Afghanistan and seized the missiles—Afghan rebel chief so incensed his men kidnapped 2 (Chinese) engineers working with the Pakistani government and holds them for ransom. Foul-ups legendary in intelligence circles in Pakistan and tribal leaders in Afghanistan. Washington Post 3/7/94 a1,14

Afghanistan, Pakistan, 86 In March 86 U.S. began giving Stinger missiles to the Mujaheddin. Shift occurred after activists in Pentagon, and CIA backed by conservative senators, overcame opposition. Opponents argued that introducing U.S.-made arms into third world conflicts would escalate into U.S.-USSR conflicts and there no guarantee advanced weapons would not fall into terrorist hands. British Blowpipes also used. Washington Post 7/23/86 a1,12

Afghanistan, 90 Afghan guerrillas veto drive for Kabul. Pakistan's Inter-Services intelligence agency (ISI) preparing for offensive on Kabul to be led by Gulbaddin Hekmatar, a radical Moslem fundamentalist. ISI controls distribution of CIA and Saudi-supplied weapons. Aborted offensive reveals difference between CIA and the Department of State. State argued against assault, CIA officers urged the assault. Washington Post 11/4/90 a27,28

Afghanistan, Pakistan 80-90 Two part article based on information from intelligence officials: Pakistani General Mohammed Yousaf who wrote book “The Bear Trap;” and more than a dozen senior western officials. Three training camps near Afghan border where Mujaheddin fire heavy weapons and learn to make bombs with CIA-supplied plastic explosives. DCI Casey in 84, during visit convinced Pakistanis to ship propaganda through Afghanistan to USSR Muslim southern republics. CIA supplied thousands of Korans, as well as books on USSR atrocities. U.S. “chickened-out” on taking Afghan war into Soviet soil but Casey ruthless. Intel coup triggered decision to escalate. U.S. received highly specific, sensitive info re USSR war plans in Afghanistan. 3/85 NSDD 166, sharply escalated U.S. op by providing high technology military expertise. In 85 CIA gave extensive satellite reconnaissance data, plans for military ops based on satellite intelligence, intercepts of USSR communications, nets for rebels, delayed timing devices for tons of plastic explosives for urban sabotage, long-range sniper rifles, a targeting device for mortars linked to U.S. navy satellite, wire-guided anti-tank missiles, and Stinger missiles, etc. Washington Post 7/19/92 a1,6

Afghanistan, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, China, USSR, 80-90 first years of the Reagan Administration, covert Afghan war handled out of (DCI) Casey's back pocket. By 85 U.S. increase in U.S. arms supplies—rose to 65,000 tons annually by 87 as well as a ceaseless stream of CIA and P Pentagon specialists to ISI Headquarters near Rawalpindi who helped plan ops by as many as 11 ISI teams trained and supplied by CIA who accompanied Mujaheddin across border. Teams attacked airports, railroads, fuel depots, electricity pylons, bridges and roads. Washington Post 7/19/92 a1,6

Pakistan, Afghanistan, 81-92 A basic course on Who's Who of Mujahaddin. Lohbeck, K. (1993). Holy War, Unholy Victory 6-4

Afghanistan, Germany, 86 A Kuwaitian is trained in explosives, gets false Afghanistan papers made by the CIA in the Frankfurt Headquarters (Dept. of Army Detachment), is flown to Pakistan, goes from there to Afghanistan. Der Speigel 10/6/86.

Afghanistan, 79-90 Mujaheddin commanders inside Afghanistan control huge fields of opium poppies and reap harvest of as much as four million pounds of opium a year. By 89 Afghanistan and Pakistan produced as much heroin as rest of world combined. Weiner, T. (1990). Blank Check: The Pentagon's Black Budget 151-152

Afghanistan, 82 Sales of opium fund Afghan rebels. The DEA said 52% of the heroin brought into the U.S. last year is believed to have come from the area of Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran. U.S. policy contradictory it wants to fight the drug traffic and to drive the USSR out of Afghanistan. 250 to 300 tons opium were produced in Afghanistan in 1981 . That quantity could be converted into 25 to 30 tons of heroin. Processing done in Pakistan. Drug traffickers in U.S. import 4 to 4 1/2 tons of heroin a year. Washington Post 12/17/83

Afghanistan, 86 a Department of State report describes Afghanistan and the bordering tribal areas of Pakistan as “the world's leading source of illicit heroin exports to the US and Europe. The sale of this opium plays an important part in the finances of the CIA-backed Afghan rebels. New York Times 6/20/86 from Intel Parapolitics 9/86 p7

Afghanistan, 89 The Administration is dickering over how best to arm the Mujahedeen. Areas controlled by them include some of the most fertile centers of opium production. DOS report circa 3/89 said Afghanistan produced 700 to 800 metric tons of opium 88, most from territory held by rebels. Representative Bill McCollum hit CIA over handling of mujahedeen and working through Pakistan's intelligence service. The Nation 10/16/89 412

Afghanistan, Iran, Pakistan. (Golden Crescent) accounts for 75% all heroin in U.S. In 1983 4.5 tons heroin came to the U.S. from the Golden Crescent. Covert Action Information Bulletin (now Covert Action Quarterly) Summer 87 11

Afghanistan, Pakistan, 80-90 17 DEA agents assigned to the U.S. embassy in Islamabad. DEA reports identified 40 significant narcotics syndicates in Pakistan. Despite high quality of DEA intelligence, not a major syndicate investigated by Pakistani police in a decade. Hekmatyar himself controlled six heroin refineries. Without fear of arrest heroin dealers began exporting product to Europe and America, capturing more than 50% of both markets. When Pakistani police picked up Hamid Hasnain, V.P. of gvt's Habib bank, they found in his briefcase the personal records of president Zia. Blatant official corruption continued until General Zia's death in an air crash. Typical of misinformation that blocked any U.S. action against Pakistan's heroin trade, the State Department's semi-annual narcotics review in September called General Zia a strong supporter of anti-narcotics activities in Pakistan. McCoy, A.W. (1991). The Politics Of Heroin: CIA Complicity in the Global Drug Traffic 456

Afghanistan, Pakistan, 85-90 U.S. government avoids investigating drug trade run by Afghan resistance movement. Government has info re heroin deals Gulbaddin Hekmatjar, leader of mujaheddin but takes no action. Barnett Rubin of Yale based on Washington Post story: “people attempting research this connection receive hardly any support. Our relationship with Pakistani military is centerpiece our strategic presence in Southern Asia and even in the Persian Gulf.” Article outlines movement of weapons and drugs via Pakistani ISI and the National Logistic Cell (NLC) entirely owned by Pakistani army. top secret s/a-90 17-18

From about 48-91 CIA involved in drug traffic at 3 levels: 1) coincidental Complicity through covert alliances with groups actively engaged in drugs; 2) support of traffic by covering up for drug lord allies; 3) active engagement in transport of opium and heroin. From Burma's opium traffic in 50s and growth of golden triangle in sea in 60s and 70s U.S. role a catalyst. in 5/80 Dr. David Musto, angry. In late 77 he was on Carter's White House Strategy Council on Drug Abuse. Next two years CIA and other intelligence agencies denied Council access to all classified info on drug traffic. CIA lied about dollar role of drugs. Dr. Joyce Lowinson another Council member in New York Times op-ed criticized policy. Both Musto and Lowinson worried about drugs in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Drug Enforcement Agency investigated surge of drugs from southern Asia. Drug traffic in U.S. in large part due to failure Drug Enforcement Agency's interdiction and CIA's covert ops. CIA ops transformed southern Asia to major supplier of world heroin. By 1988 there an estimated 100 to 200 heroin refineries in the Kyber district alone. Trucks from Pakistani army's logistics with CIA arms often returned loaded with heroin—protected with papers from Pakistan's ISI. Drug Enforcement Agency said there were 40 significant narcotics syndicates in Pakistan. Annual earnings $8 to 10 billion. Progressive 7/91 20-26. From Alfred McCoy's book, Politics Of Heroin: CIA Complicity in Global drug trade, a revised edition to be published in July 1991

Drug Enforcement Agency December 83 says Afghanistan rebels are financing their battle at least partially through sale opium, some of which comes to U.S. in form of heroin. David Melodic, Drug Enforcement Agency's congressional liaison said 52% of heroin brought into U.S. last year believed to have come from area of Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran. American interests Afghanistan contradictory over fighting drug traffic and political goals. Washington Post 12/17/83

Pakistan, Afghanistan, 79-89 The Mujahedden rebels keep their cause going through the sale of opium. Drug Enforcement Agency spokesman said “no less than half of all U.S. heroin came from that area of the world.” Gulbaddin Hekmatyar is responsible for murdering hundreds of dedicated resistance fighters, political workers, and intellectuals. He reportedly was a leading figure in the heroin trade. Details of corruption emerged from U.S. sources only after the Soviets began pulling out of Afghanistan. By 1989, Pakistan had no fewer than 100 heroin labs near the border of Afghanistan. CIA had used a Lebanese-controlled currency firm in Zurich, Shakarchi Trading to channel aid to the Afghan rebels. Marshall, j. (1991). drug Wars 49-52

Southern Asia, 80-90 during 80s CIA ops in Afghanistan transformed South Asia from a self-contained opium zone to major supplier heroin on the world market. Saudi Arabia delivered their aid directly to client guerrilla groups inside Afghanistan, most allied agencies, the CIA included, worked through General Zia's [of Pakistan], Inter Service Intel (ISI). CIA relationship with ISI complex, CIA commanded vast arsenal of funds and high-tech weapons that dwarfed ISI's meager budget. McCoy, A.W. (1991). the Politics Of Heroin: CIA Complicity in the Global Drug Traffic 49

Pakistan-Afghanistan border and Iran, 81 the Golden Crescent area where most heroin coming into U.S. in book “Weltmacht Droge” Austrian journalist Hans Georg Behr shows the connection between aid provided by Western intelligence agencies and increased heroin shipping to West. He spent two weeks with Afghan rebels who smuggling opium to Pakistan. Money exchanged for arms. Counterspy 10/81 29-30

Pakistan, Afghanistan, 84 Bush meets with the leader of Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate and Bush agreed for 3.2 billion in new US aid over and above the 2 billion allocated to the Afghan op. Yet by 1984, according to European police sources, Pakistan was furnishing 70% of the world's supply of high-grade heroin. CIA's arms pipeline to Afghan mujahedeen is organized and coordinated by Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence. The main carrier is the national logistic cell, owned by the Pakistan army, it is the largest transport org in the country. US has 17 officers in Pakistan who work exclusively on narcotics. The DEA contingent includes several CIA officers. CIA has gathered intelligence on narcotics since 75. European police who work with DEA claim that US agents have identified 40 significant narcotics syndicates in Pakistan yet none have been broken up in past ten years. Nation article gives a background paragraph on the history of CIA ops and drug traffic. The Nation 11/14/88 477,492,94-6

Afghanistan, Pakistan, 86-87 CIA supplying counterfeit Afghan money for several years. It acquired an excellent set of plates without a blemish. CIA bills arrive in Pakistan and are sold for full value in Peshawar and Quetta. Jack Anderson, Washington Post 5/4/87

81-92 Afghanistan, Pakistan, 81-92 Because of relationship between DCI Casey and General Acktar, CIA became advisor and supplier of aid to Mujahaddin. CIA personnel in Pakistan, were notoriously unlearned in culture and political atmosphere of Afghans. CIA supported Gulbaddin and Ahmed Ahah Masood at the expense of other Afghans who had a much broader-based constituency. Lohbeck, K. (1993). Holy War, Unholy Victory 163

Afghanistan, 76-89 A criticism of the CIA's handling of the op in Afghanistan by Bill McCollum, Republican congressman from Florida and chairman of a GOP task force on terrorism and unconventional warfare. After 10 years and nearly $2 billion in American aid culminating in a monumentally incompetent program of arms procurement and distribution. Hekmatyar's party—recipient of much of much of the aid—implicated in dozens of disappearances and outright murders of rival commanders and Afghan intellectuals. Hekmatyar loyal to Pakistan's ISI that acts as a proxy for CIA. Washington Post 9/10/89 c-1,4

USSR, Pakistan, Afghanistan, 82-87 DCI Casey renewed acquaintance with General Acktar Abdul Rahman Khan. During tenure Casey made 6 trips to coordinate with Acktar. Casey considered himself commander-in-chief against USSR in Afghan. Within 2 years after 1st visit, CIA station in Islamabad became largest in world outside of Langley Headquarters. Lohbeck, K. (1993). Holy War, Unholy Victory 52

Afghanistan, Pakistan, 81-92 Reed Irvine of Committee for a Free Afghanistan, and Andy Eiva, started a letterhead org called Afghan-American Federation. Federation helpful in finding doctors and hospitals that would take severely wounded. Committee also hired people to advise the Mujahaddin military. One was Ted Mataksis who also advised re Central America and Cambodian rebels. Lohbeck, K. (1993). Holy War, Unholy Victory

Afghanistan, Pakistan, USSR, 60-90 ISI's Headquarters in a large camp of 70-80 acres north of Rawalpindi, 12 kilometers from Islamabad. Inside high walls were offices, transit warehouse through which passed 70 percent of all arms and ammo for the Mujahideen, at least 300 vehicles, several acres of training area, a psywar unit, barracks, messhalls and the Stinger training school. This called Ojhri camp. General Akhtar set up another organization for the provision of clothing and rations purchased in huge quantities throughout Pakistan, with CIA money. Major contribution from CIA to Afghan war was satellite intelligence through photographs. Mohammad Yousai & Adkin, M. (1992). the Bear Trap: Afghanistan's Untold Story 27,29, 93

Afghanistan, Pakistan, USSR, 80-90 There were seven Afghan resistance parties formed into an alliance. Political heads of each party called a leader to distinguish from the Mujahideen military commanders. Alliance established after 83. until the Quetta incident, commanders usually received supplies directly from ISI. Supplies then channeled through the parties. Gulbadin Hekmatyar is the youngest and toughest of alliance leaders. Mohammad Yousai & Adkin, M. (1992). the Bear Trap: Afghanistan's Untold Story 40-1

Afghanistan, Pakistan, 85-92 Islamic fundamentalist Gulbaddin Hekmatyar per General Yousaf by 87 received only about 20% of annual allocations of money and weapons. All 4 fundamentalist parties combined received 75%, leaving small amounts for the three moderate parties. U.S. covert program in Afghanistan effectively ended 1/1/92. Program a success. Washington Post 7/20/92 a1,12

Afghanistan, Pakistan, USSR, 80-90 A discussion of the weapons and equipment pipeline. It in three distinct parts with the CIA owning the first part, the purchase and transport of weapons to Pakistan. Second part ISI's responsibility—getting everything carried across Pakistan, allocated to, and handed over to the parties at their Headquarters near Peshawar and Quetta. The third leg was the parties allocated weapons to their commanders and distributed inside Afghanistan. On 1987 the broad percentages allocated to the parties were Hekmatyar 18-20 percent, Rabbani 18-19 per cent, Sayaf 17-18 per cent, Khalis 13-15 percent, Nabi 13-15 percent, Gailani 10-11 percent, and Mujaddadi 3-5 percent. Fundamentalists received a total of 67-73 percent. Mohammad Yousai & Adkin, M. (1992). The Bear Trap: Afghanistan's Untold Story 97, 105

I wonder if one day that, you'll say that, you care
If you say you love me madly, I'll gladly, be there
Like a puppet on a string

Love is just like a merry-go-round
With all the fun in the air
One day I'm feeling down on the ground
Then I'm up in the air
Are you leading me on?
Tomorrow will you be gone?

I wonder if one day that, you'll say that, you care
If you love me madly, I'll gladly, be there
Like a puppet on a string

I may win on the roundabout
Then I'll lose on the swings
In or out, there is never a doubt
Just who's pulling the strings
I'm all tied up to you
But where's it leading me to?

I wonder if one day that, you'll say that, you care
If you say you love me madly, I'll gladly, be there
Like a puppet on a string

I wonder if one day that, you'll say that, you care
If you say you love me madly, I'll gladly, be there
Like a puppet on a string

Like a puppet on a..... string
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ted_bloody_maulOffline
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PostPosted: 27-05-2007 01:35    Post subject: Reply with quote

As pointed out on several occasions in those articles, however, the CIA were effectively working blind through the ISI. The idea that this means they created Al-Qaeda, let alone creating it so it could later be controlled like a puppet on a string, is well wide of the mark.
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Pietro_Mercurios
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PostPosted: 27-05-2007 01:53    Post subject: Reply with quote

ted_bloody_maul wrote:
As pointed out on several occasions in those articles, however, the CIA were effectively working blind through the ISI. The idea that this means they created Al-Qaeda, let alone creating it so it could later be controlled like a puppet on a string, is well wide of the mark.

Did I wake you up, Ted_Bloody_Maul?

All that money, all that heavy armament, all the covert ops training, yet the CIA, or that sub-group within the organisation most heavily involved, have absolutely no idea what's really going on, yet they put their blind trust in foreign agents and agencies, to act on their behalf...

With no idea who's telling the truth, or what's true, or real, we live in a World in which Conspiracies don't occur and when they do, they are only instigated by foreigners.

Apparently. gaga
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ted_bloody_maulOffline
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PostPosted: 27-05-2007 15:20    Post subject: Reply with quote

Pietro_Mercurios wrote:
Did I wake you up, Ted_Bloody_Maul?


Erm, no. Confused I was wide awake and fully cognisant of what I was posting and how often.

Pietro_Mercurios wrote:
All that money, all that heavy armament, all the covert ops training, yet the CIA, or that sub-group within the organisation most heavily involved, have absolutely no idea what's really going on, yet they put their blind trust in foreign agents and agencies, to act on their behalf...


Well that's your rather simplistic interpretation. The point is that their contact with the Mujahadeen, which was a coalition of disparate groups and people, was tempered by the involvement of the ISI who took responsibility for the distribution of weaponry etc to the fighters on the ground. Nowhere in those two article (and by that I mean the two articles within the original post rather than including the repetition of them) does it mention Bin Laden - by the time of that article's publication suspected of international terrorism and of the recent US embassy bombings. One might expect that if there were any evidence of America's direct funding or training this would have been referred to. It wasn't.

Perhaps if you have some evidence of this you might like to post it given that's the point you're trying to make (although even then that's not a particularly relevant point wrt to the relationship between Bin Laden and the US today).



Pietro_Mercurios wrote:
With no idea who's telling the truth, or what's true, or real, we live in a World in which Conspiracies don't occur and when they do, they are only instigated by foreigners.

Apparently. gaga


Again, that's your interpretation although I might say that it's somewhat inaccurate.
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Seventh_PilotOffline
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PostPosted: 28-05-2007 12:23    Post subject: Reply with quote

Your snobbery not withstanding Ted, it is my understanding that the term Al Quaeda was an umbrella term used by the CIA to cover a number of not very significant extremist Islamic groups prior to 9/11. Would you agree with this? It then, of course, morphed into this SPECTRE type organization that the media would have us believe was around every corner, led by a relative of a family with close ties to the American President and suffering from kidney failure living in a cave somewhere in the arse end of Afghanistan. Is that simplistic enough for you? Do you really believe the CIA was blind in its training and funding of the Mujahadeen? Actually where did the funding come from? The former agents speaking on an SBS documentary a few weeks back, on this very subject, didn’t seem blind to it, nor the former Mujahadeen fighters. Perhaps it was the Contras you were thinking of? Then again perhaps not. Wink
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ted_bloody_maulOffline
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PostPosted: 28-05-2007 13:08    Post subject: Reply with quote

Seventh_Pilot wrote:
Your snobbery not withstanding Ted, it is my understanding that the term Al Quaeda was an umbrella term used by the CIA to cover a number of not very significant extremist Islamic groups prior to 9/11. Would you agree with this? It then, of course, morphed into this SPECTRE type organization that the media would have us believe was around every corner, led by a relative of a family with close ties to the American President and suffering from kidney failure living in a cave somewhere in the arse end of Afghanistan. Is that simplistic enough for you? Do you really believe the CIA was blind in its training and funding of the Mujahadeen? Actually where did the funding come from? The former agents speaking on an SBS documentary a few weeks back, on this very subject, didn’t seem blind to it, nor the former Mujahadeen fighters. Perhaps it was the Contras you were thinking of? Then again perhaps not. Wink


Your bizzare allegations of snobbery aside, I would agree in part with your explanation of what Al-Qaeda was initially believed to be. It was defined so Bin Laden could be prosecuted in his absence in the same way that the antimafia laws were used. It's claimed that Al-Qaeda was first named at this point although Bin Laden himself claims otherwise.

It has grown since that point and that's largely due to 9/11 and the responses to it. Yes, Bin Laden's family has links with the Bush family but then Bin Laden's family is rather large and families don't always get on. Besides - if the link between Bush, the Saudis and the Bin Ladens was so strong why would he have been forced out of Saudi Arabia? It doesn't make much sense to get rid of a CIA asset given that the threat to Saudi Arabia from Bin Laden would have been known to have been a cover by all parties concerned.

Quite what difference Bin Laden's health may have made (and the kidney story seems to be a myth invented by the ISI) is anyone's guess but I seem to recall a guy in a wheelchair succesfully commanding his nation in the most destructive war the world has ever known. It's a bizzare argument to present in any case unless you believe people are claiming Bin Laden had never heard of telecommunications or that he was running around like an Arab Sly Stallone taking out New York.

Whether I believe the CIA was working blind is as irrelevant as whether you believe they were not. Belief only tends to betray prejudice and doesn't really add anything to the debate. Evidence does and unless you can provide some which contradicts that claim then you can believe what you like but you can't prove it. Unless you can provide some sort of links to the content of a TV program you watched then their opinions aren't really worth discussing. In any case even if they were not blind in their funding and training this does not mean that they had a relationship with Bin Laden let alone conscripting him into a phony war more than a decade on from that relationship.

What you've written has been simplistic enough, so thanks for taking the time. However, I'm pretty much certain that I'm not thinking of the Contras. I apologise if my points, based mainly on reports which have so far been unsuccessfully debunked, lead anyone to that confusion. Now if you'll excuse me I have to go and snobbishly beat my servants for bringing my gazpacho to me cold.


Last edited by ted_bloody_maul on 28-05-2007 21:16; edited 1 time in total
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PostPosted: 28-05-2007 17:37    Post subject: Reply with quote

Just to clarify. Is it being proposed that because the CIA funded elements of the mujahedin prior to and during the Russian invasion and occupation of Afghanistan that they must therefore be controlling al Qaeda now? Isn't that basically a non-secitur and doesn't it ignore the fact that history contains a liberal smattering of examples of people firing up, funding and training their enemy's enemy only to find out that that happy state of briefly converging common aims is not necessarily a permanent one?

Also. Although I don't doubt that many elements of the US administration and its various appendages have pissed themselves with glee at the opportunities that have arisen because of the present situation is it not a logical fallacy to conclude that because someone profits from an action they must therefore be responsible for that action. Christ, if that were true we'd all be in deep shit. My grandad died a few months back and I got a modest, but very welcome inheritance. I'm assuming that various contributers to this discussion would have had me banged up for murder before you could say "99yearsoldchronickidneyfailure."

I'm sure that there are members of all kinds of Western intelligence agencies who would cut there own extremities off with cheesewire to aquire the kind of power over internal issues and foriegn policy that remotely controlling an organisation like al Qaeda would give them, but the two basic arguments that it seems to me are being fielded here to propose that theory don't appear very strong.

(Edited for bad grammar. 4/10 See me after class.)


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PostPosted: 28-05-2007 18:23    Post subject: Reply with quote

Interesting quote -

Quote:
Personally neither I nor my brothers saw any evidence of American help.


This is bin Laden speaking to the journalist Robert Fisk in 1993 as quoted in his brilliant history/memoir The Great War for Civilisation. The Conquest of the Middle East.

Of course there are various reasons bin Laden would deny having seen or taken advantage of American military aid. And of course if he was working for the CIA all the time he would deny it, wouldn't he? Or, then again, he might be telling the truth. Given the disaparate nature of the mujahedin (the word doesn't apply to a particular group or even an organisation. It's my understanding that it's more of an umbrella description than a name and should be lower case unless the word has been employed by a particular group to describe itself, as in Mujahedin-e-Qalq, the People's Mujahedin) there's no reason the latter scenario constitutes a denial by bin-Laden that there was US involvement with various groups in Afghanistan.
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SameOldVardoger
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PostPosted: 28-05-2007 20:32    Post subject: Reply with quote

CIA may give the Al Qaida cells money through some of those business and organisation fronts they use. CIA might even run a muslim organization themselves to get in touch with muslim fundamentalists.
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coldelephant
PostPosted: 29-05-2007 07:49    Post subject: Reply with quote

I agree with the idea that just because the CIA may have funded band(s) of terrorists before and given them weapons and training does not mean they are behind Al Qaida.

IMO Al Qaida is a name that has been bandied about by the global mass hysterical media hype conglomerate (I made up that one, I hope people use it Wink ) following 9/11.

You see, they needed to label these terrorists and make them into a big enemy - so big an enemy that the full might of the USA was needed to hunt it down and defeat it.

That enemy was to be - Al Qaida.

Then the story got strange Ted_Bloody_Maul.

Our huge, important and deadly enemy was old, and had kidney failure.

How did he get out of Afghanistan into Pakistan?

Where did he get his handy easy to get into mountain caves portable dialysis machine from?

Why could the full might of the awesome USA not find this withering decrepit old man?

Stay tuned folks! Another possibly fake possibly not according to which expert you listen to tape coming out soon!
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PostPosted: 29-05-2007 08:32    Post subject: Reply with quote

coldelephant wrote:

Our huge, important and deadly enemy was old, and had kidney failure.

How did he get out of Afghanistan into Pakistan?

Where did he get his handy easy to get into mountain caves portable dialysis machine from?

Why could the full might of the awesome USA not find this withering decrepit old man?


As pointed out before he didn't have kidney failure and the story was put out (before 9/11) by someone quoting the ISI. He was hardly old either.

Again, so what? Why didn't the fulll might of the Japanese and the Nazis not manage to take out Roosevelt? If people find it strange that a man who doesn't have kidney failure managed to escape from the American military so be it but it offers little insight to anything more than what people choose to believe.
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PostPosted: 29-05-2007 08:32    Post subject: Reply with quote

coldelephant wrote:
Then the story got strange...


Well, not really.

The CIA have (allegedly - on and off, like) been trying to slot Castro for decades. This is a chap who lives, in relative terms, not a mouses fart away from the coast of Florida, delivers speeches that go on for the best part of a day (and presumably has to stand relatively still for most of their duration) loves publicity and makes no more of a secret of his whereabouts than most other world leaders - and whose nation's population contains a sizeable chunk of persons, both resident and ex-pat, who would dearly like to see the back of him. And they haven't managed that one.

Bin Laden is (or was) a man of huge personal wealth, immensly popular throughout large sections of the Arab/Muslim world, regardless of national allegiance, and with access to all the co-operation that popularity entails - whose last known place of residence was a chain of mountains, unfamiliar to even the nuttiest, most swivel-eyed, of western mountaineers, so possibly not that familiar to the US military (who after all had to invade Grenada using tourist maps). Which chain of mountains sits near an unpoliceable national border which is not recognised by the majority of actual residents of the area and supplies access to another regional power who's population contains a large caucus of people to whom bin Laden is a hero. Not only that but the top echelons of bin Laden's organisation (whatever it's called) has a propensity towards university trained engineers and doctors. These aren't stupid or unqualified people and I think given the circumstances, the fact that bin Laden, sick or not, hasn't been captured isn't really much of a cause for mystery.

Having said all that I think one of the the main reasons he hasn't been caught is the fact that he's dead, and has been for quite a long time.
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coldelephant
PostPosted: 29-05-2007 11:49    Post subject: Reply with quote

Hang on a sec.

Does he have kidney failure or not? How do we know?

Also - if he is dead, how do we know?

With regard to Castro - that is a very good point. Why is he not dead yet? Surely they could just do a JFK and shoot him while he is rambling on at one of his speach-a-thons?

Although some might say that Bin Laden has not died, and has not been caught because he and his family have close ties with the Dubya.

Wink
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PostPosted: 29-05-2007 12:07    Post subject: Reply with quote

coldelephant wrote:
Hang on a sec.

Does he have kidney failure or not? How do we know?


Well we don't know but there's no credible evidence which suggests that he does.
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PostPosted: 29-05-2007 12:58    Post subject: Reply with quote

Bizarre Ted? I think it would be relatively easy to demonstrate you have a tendency toward intellectual snobbery. Problem is just because you obviously outwit us with your intellectual might doesn’t mean your right, or rather the sources and other peoples opinions you use are right.
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