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waitew Great Old One Joined: 15 Apr 2004 Total posts: 301 Gender: Unknown |
 Posted: 26-05-2007 08:04 Post subject: Al Quaeda works for the CIA..why shouldn't I believe this? |
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Considering everything Al Quaeda does seems to benifit certain elements of the US government & certain US corporations... from 911, providing an excuse for invading Afganistan & thus providing a route for pipelines for Caspian Basin oil/gas to profitably reach the west..to the dalily attacks in Iraq which provide an excuse to keep Iraqi oil off the market & thus keep oil prices high, resulting in record profits for both US oil companies & US defence contractors.
Considering the history of Al Quaeda.... created by the CIA to fight the Soviets in Afganistan..& the close relationship between the Bin Ladins & the Bushes....Osama's brother funding 'W's' 1st failed texas oil business,Bush senior being with Osama's brother on 911 & lying about it, The bushes flying the Bin Ladin family out of the USA post 911 when one one else was allowed to fly..to allowing Osama to 'escape ' at Tora Bora.....tell me,why shouldn't i believe that Al Quaeda still works for elements in Washington? |
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| Iggore Customize This !!!
Great Old One Joined: 01 Aug 2005 Total posts: 530 Location: Shmocation Age: 28 Gender: Unknown |
| Posted: 26-05-2007 08:24 Post subject: |
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Al quaeda is a grab-all term used to describe any muslim terrorist groups, mayb it be Bin Laden's operation in afghanistan or two iraqi brothers who decided one fine morning to bomb a school. Its not a cohesive network, its just a bunch of groups who's common thread is terrorism, islam, and more or less common goals. Its not like they work together or answer to a central authority.
As such, no, I dont think thast the CIA as anything to do with all of this beside the funding and sponsoring of mujahideens fighting against the URSS in Afghanistan.
Here's an alternative theory, although this one is boring; international islamic terrorism wasn't caused by the american puppet masters, but by genuine religious fanatisme alone. The folks at the CIA only used it to serve their own ends when they could, much like the British Empire used the arabs when it still had influence in the region, but Al Quaeda still remaine an independant phenomena in its own right.
Last edited by Iggore on 26-05-2007 08:35; edited 1 time in total |
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| waitew Great Old One Joined: 15 Apr 2004 Total posts: 301 Gender: Unknown |
| Posted: 26-05-2007 08:33 Post subject: |
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| Ok,so what are you saying here?that any muslim who commits a crime that could be considered 'terrorism' is therefore A member..de facto..of Al Quaeda?that's even worse!That means it's an undefined enemy & pretty soon it wont just be dark skinned people or muslims but anybody who commits any crime that they consider 'terrorism'!Sorry,you have got to have a better...more precise definition than that if you wish to steal my civil rights & enslave me! |
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| Iggore Customize This !!!
Great Old One Joined: 01 Aug 2005 Total posts: 530 Location: Shmocation Age: 28 Gender: Unknown |
| Posted: 26-05-2007 08:39 Post subject: |
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To be precise, I meant that some of those who commit terrorism usualy identified themselves with Al Quadea despite having acted alone, perhapes because they feel they contributed to the same cause or whatever.
But yeah, sometimes its just certain medias who interprete every act of terrorism as being orchestrated by Al Quaeda despit having no proof. Its just an attempt to give substance and cohesion to a threatening international movement that real isnt structured. |
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| waitew Great Old One Joined: 15 Apr 2004 Total posts: 301 Gender: Unknown |
| Posted: 26-05-2007 08:44 Post subject: |
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| Ok,here's another one. Al Quaeda certainly was created by & did work for the CIA.What proof to you have that they don't still?Is it just the word of people who have clearly benefitted from their actions?please give me you're proof? |
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| Jerry_B Great Old One Joined: 15 Apr 2002 Total posts: 8265 |
| Posted: 26-05-2007 09:35 Post subject: |
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How about proving that Al Q was 'created by the CIA' first?
It's also a moot point that Al Q actually exists at all, and that what's called Al Q is actually various different groups, who perhaps aren't even working from the same remit. |
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| ted_bloody_maul Great Old One Joined: 23 May 2003 Total posts: 4877 Location: Quester's Psykick Dancehall Gender: Unknown |
| Posted: 26-05-2007 09:51 Post subject: Re: Al Quaeda works for the CIA..why shouldn't I believe thi |
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| waitew wrote: | Considering everything Al Quaeda does seems to benifit certain elements of the US government & certain US corporations... from 911, providing an excuse for invading Afganistan & thus providing a route for pipelines for Caspian Basin oil/gas to profitably reach the west..to the dalily attacks in Iraq which provide an excuse to keep Iraqi oil off the market & thus keep oil prices high, resulting in record profits for both US oil companies & US defence contractors.
Considering the history of Al Quaeda.... created by the CIA to fight the Soviets in Afganistan..& the close relationship between the Bin Ladins & the Bushes....Osama's brother funding 'W's' 1st failed texas oil business,Bush senior being with Osama's brother on 911 & lying about it, The bushes flying the Bin Ladin family out of the USA post 911 when one one else was allowed to fly..to allowing Osama to 'escape ' at Tora Bora.....tell me,why shouldn't i believe that Al Quaeda still works for elements in Washington? |
I'm afraid that the majority of examples you've given here don't actually stand up to scrutiny. The claims are often made and repeated but very few of them are actually accurate (the Bin Ladens being flown out when no-one else was allowed to fly, for example). Also the whole issue of who benefits is contentious. If we use that logic there would be a whole host of characters who would be in the frame, most notably Islamic terrorists. |
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| coldelephant |
| Posted: 26-05-2007 16:01 Post subject: |
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| Iggore wrote: |
Al quaeda is a grab-all term used to describe any muslim terrorist groups, |
I agree with that - it is a bit of spin as well IMO, don't know who invented it but it was probably suggested to somebody and then it snowballed into mass media.
| Iggore wrote: |
Here's an alternative theory, although this one is boring; international islamic terrorism wasn't caused by the american puppet masters, but by genuine religious fanatisme alone. The folks at the CIA only used it to serve their own ends when they could, much like the British Empire used the arabs when it still had influence in the region, but Al Quaeda still remaine an independant phenomena in its own right. |
I can believe that as well, that the individual groups were found, then supported and set against each other or another enemy suggests using these fantatic tribal zealots as pawns in an imperial game of world chess or Risk or something.
Marvellous.
I wonder which of the Bilderburgers are winning right now?  |
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| Quake42 Warrior Princess
Great Old One Joined: 25 Feb 2004 Total posts: 5212 Location: Over Silbury Hill, through the Solar field Gender: Unknown |
| Posted: 26-05-2007 17:30 Post subject: |
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| Quote: | | Ok,so what are you saying here?that any muslim who commits a crime that could be considered 'terrorism' is therefore A member..de facto..of Al Quaeda? |
It's not an organisation with membership lists, subscriptions and a hierarchy. "Al-Qaeda" now is basically a brand - a banner which violent jihadis all over the world can claim to stand under. The bombers in Madrid and London were not "Al-Qaeda members" as such, but they clearly identified with the message of bin Laden and co. |
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| ted_bloody_maul Great Old One Joined: 23 May 2003 Total posts: 4877 Location: Quester's Psykick Dancehall Gender: Unknown |
| Posted: 26-05-2007 19:40 Post subject: |
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| Quake42 wrote: |
It's not an organisation with membership lists, subscriptions and a hierarchy. "Al-Qaeda" now is basically a brand - a banner which violent jihadis all over the world can claim to stand under. The bombers in Madrid and London were not "Al-Qaeda members" as such, but they clearly identified with the message of bin Laden and co. |
I suspect the term Al-Qaeda is by now interchangeable with Islamist terrorism in much the same way as Neo-Nazi is for any extreme right-wing group. The Nazis were just one of many fascist movements and not the first either but their imprint was the most visible and the most discussed. Where they might differ is that the philosophy of Al-Qaeda is not confined within borders and nor are those who subscribe to it in opposition to each other the way extreme nationalist groups might be. In a sense it might be more like an internationalist movement like Marxism although within that there have been many states or factions which have competed in the popular consciousness to define that particular movement. |
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| Quake42 Warrior Princess
Great Old One Joined: 25 Feb 2004 Total posts: 5212 Location: Over Silbury Hill, through the Solar field Gender: Unknown |
| Posted: 27-05-2007 00:08 Post subject: |
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| Quote: | | In a sense it might be more like an internationalist movement like Marxism although within that there have been many states or factions which have competed in the popular consciousness to define that particular movement. |
Except that virtually every Marxist group has had a very tight organisational structure with a clear hierarchy... that is clearly not the case with Al-Qaeda and AQ-inspired groups/individuals.
I do think the best way of looking at AQ is as a brand - and like many top commercial brands today, there is little central organisation and a lot of outsourcing. |
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| ted_bloody_maul Great Old One Joined: 23 May 2003 Total posts: 4877 Location: Quester's Psykick Dancehall Gender: Unknown |
| Posted: 27-05-2007 01:45 Post subject: |
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| Quake42 wrote: |
Except that virtually every Marxist group has had a very tight organisational structure with a clear hierarchy... that is clearly not the case with Al-Qaeda and AQ-inspired groups/individuals.
I do think the best way of looking at AQ is as a brand - and like many top commercial brands today, there is little central organisation and a lot of outsourcing. |
True - essentially Al-Qaeda shares many similarities with a franchise. The point I was making, though, was more to do with how they're capable of functioning independently of each other, much like the Marxist movement, although they have the same ultimate goal. Although there is a hierarchy within individual Marxist movements that hierarchy doesn't apply globally and the destruction of any given localised group need not damage the others.
In the end this will be why the war on terror as presently defined will be unsuccessful - its lack of a specific hierarchy, Bin Laden aside (and he's more of a figurehead than anything else), makes it impossible to extinguish it at every level simultaneously, particularly given the value ascribed to martyrdom - if Bin Laden was killed, for example, the movement would continue and may even strengthen. The fact that any attempts to do so seem to require a great deal of collateral damage only serves to enhance the appeal of both the philosophy and its better known advocates. |
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| Pietro_Mercurios Heuristically Challenged
Gender: Unknown |
| Posted: 27-05-2007 02:14 Post subject: More on that Cut 'n' Paste Orgy, later! |
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"Outsourcing", "Franchising", 'Cellular Networks'? 
| Quote: | http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Central_Intelligence_Agency
Central Intelligence Agency
...
Afghanistan
Often cited as one of the American intelligence community's biggest mistakes was the training, arming, supplying and supporting of the Mujahedeen (Islamist fighters) in Afghanistan, initiated under Carter and greatly expanded under Reagan, as American proxy soldiers against the Marxist regime and later the Soviet intervention. Part of the Mujahedeen trained by the CIA later became the core cadre of Osama bin Laden's Al Qaeda Islamist organization. Zbigniew Brzezinski, the National Security Advisor under President Carter, has discussed U.S. military involvement in Afghanistan in several magazines.
... The CIA worked extensively with Pakistan's ISI throughout the Afghan-Soviet War, and works with this agency closely for the War on Terror.
... |
| Quote: | http://www.grailwerk.com/docs/nytimes10.htm
May 25, 2003
'Charlie Wilson's War': Arming the Mujahedeen
By DAVID JOHNSTON
For most of his 24-year career in the House of Representatives, Charles Wilson was known for his abiding fondness for hot tubs, women and Scotch whiskey. His friends at the Central Intelligence Agency said, only partly in jest, that the Texas Democrat's reputation as a roue provided a perfect cover for his great passion, the mujahedeen rebellion against the Soviet Union's occupation of Afghanistan. During the 1980's, Wilson used his seat on a military appropriations subcommittee to steer billions of dollars in secret funding to the C.I.A. to funnel arms to the mujahedeen.
So it was hardly a surprise after the Soviets' humiliating withdrawal in 1989 that the C.I.A.'s spymasters invited Wilson out to celebrate at the agency's headquarters at Langley, Va. On a large movie screen in an auditorium at the George Bush Center for Intelligence flashed a huge quotation from Pakistan's president, Gen. Mohammad Zia ul-Haq, who had willingly allowed the C.I.A.'s arms pipeline to flow through his country. Zia credited Wilson with the defeat of the Russians in Afghanistan with the words, ''Charlie did it.''
In ''Charlie Wilson's War,'' George Crile, a veteran ''60 Minutes'' producer, recounts the story of Wilson's personal journey from the East Texas Bible Belt to Congress, where he became the secret patron of what was then the largest covert operation in C.I.A. history. Of course, the American effort to arm the mujahedeen must be measured against recent events like the Sept. 11 attacks. The Qaeda hijackings underscored how the American-financed war against the Soviets in Afghanistan helped create a political vacuum filled by the Taliban and Islamic extremists, who turned their deadly terrorism back against the United States.
Moreover, there was concern within intelligence circles about the hundreds of Stinger missile systems that the C.I.A. supplied to the mujahedeen forces in the 1980's to combat the Russians' most fearful weapon, the Mi-24 Hind helicopter gunship. After the Soviet withdrawal, the agency embarked on a costly buyback program, but most of the missiles remained unaccounted for. American military commanders feared they might be used during the war in Afghanistan that followed the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon.
But in its time there was little dispute that the covert war was one of the most successful C.I.A. operations ever undertaken, a deadly confrontation conducted through a surrogate with the Soviet empire in its death throes.* Only a handful of people in the government knew that behind the Afghan resistance was a pirate's crew of misfits, most notably Charlie Wilson himself, whom Crile affectionately profiles as the lawmaker who widened the war through a series of backroom deals on Capitol Hill that were never publicly disclosed or debated.
For most of his years in the House until he retired in 1996, Wilson rarely spoke on the House floor and was never associated with any of the great legislative issues of his day. He infuriated colleagues like Pat Schroeder, a Colorado Democrat, by calling her ''Babycakes,'' and acknowledged when he announced his retirement that ''at times I've been a reckless and rowdy public servant.'' But Crile asserts that Wilson's flaky public persona concealed a fervent anti-Communist and deeply ambitious politician, who built a power base in Congress that he used to pour money into the Afghan cause. In return for voting for military contracts in his colleagues' districts, Wilson won votes from his fellow lawmakers for the mujahedeen.
From a few million dollars in the early 1980's, support for the resistance grew to about $750 million a year by the end of the decade. The decisions were made in secret by Wilson and other lawmakers on the appropriations committee. To help make his case, Wilson exploited one of the decade's scandals, the Iran-contra affair, arguing that Democrats who were voting to cut off funding for the contras in Nicaragua could demonstrate their willingness to stand up to the Soviet empire by approving more money for the Afghan fighters.
''Charlie Wilson's War'' is a behind-the-scenes chronicle of a program that is still largely classified. Crile does not provide much insight into his reporting methods, but the book appears to be based on interviews with a number of the principals. The result is a vivid narrative, though a reader may wonder how much of this story is true in exactly the way Crile presents it. Still, few people who remember Wilson's years in Washington would discount even the wildest tales.
Crile recounts with relish Wilson's partying. There are many anecdotes of his overseas travels, first-class at taxpayers' expense, accompanied by former beauty queens who seem to pop up at events in conservative Islamic countries wearing skintight jumpsuits. In one odd moment, according to Crile, Wilson brought his own belly dancer from Texas to Cairo to entertain the Egyptian defense minister, who was secretly supplying the mujahedeen with millions of rounds of ammunition for the AK-47's that the C.I.A. was smuggling into Afghanistan. Her sultry dancing went far beyond the prudish norms of Cairo, but delighted the powerful minister.
Crile tells us that Wilson enjoyed driving to distraction a succession of C.I.A. officials as he prodded the agency to supply the fighters with increasingly more lethal weapons. The agency bureaucrats were content with a modest program designed to bleed the Soviets, whereas Wilson envisioned a war that the mujahedeen could win. As the money for the war began to flow, the C.I.A. put one of its own misfits in charge of the operation, Gust Avrakotos. He formed a small band of agency officers who quickly got behind the war in Afghanistan. Tens of thousands of automatic weapons, antitank guns, even satellite intelligence maps, redrawn in the form of crude maps that might have been penned by the mujahedeen themselves -- all of it was carried across Pakistan's border into Afghanistan on the backs of mules procured by the C.I.A. from as far away as the Tennessee hill country.
On Feb. 15, 1989, Gen. Boris Gromov, commander of the Soviets' 40th Army, walked across Friendship Bridge as the last Russian to leave Afghanistan. The C.I.A. cable from the Islamabad station to Langley said, ''We won.'' Wilson's own note to Avrakotos said simply, ''We did it.''
David Johnston, a senior Washington correspondent for The Times, covers terrorism and national security issues.
Copyright 2003 The New York Times Company |
*Emphasis mine
| Quote: | http://www.hartford-hwp.com/archives/27d/084.html
Date: Tue, 25 Aug 98 16:37:38 CDT
From: Ralph McGehee <rmcgehee@igc.org>
Subject: CIABASE: Background to Terrorism
Organization: Institute for Global Communications
Article: 41837
To: undisclosed-recipients:;;@chumbly.math.missouri.edu
Message-ID: <bulk.29602.19980826181538@chumbly.math.missouri.edu>
A Background to Terrorism
By Ralph McGehee, CIABASE, 25 August 1998
Afghanistan, Pakistan, Egypt, 80-96 Blowback of CIA ops. CIA spent more than $3 billion dollars in 80s to train and fund the Afghan resistance—most venomously anti-Western—they form core of an international net of Islamic militants. CIA weaponry went to fundamentalist Gulbaddin Hekmatyar, one of the most anti-western leaders and until recently president of Afghanistan. His allies included Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman, serving life in the U.S. for urban terrorism. Rami Ahmed Yousef, man accused of planning the bombing of the World Trade Center was trained in Afghanistan. The terrorist net has targeted Washington's most pivotal Islamic allies—claiming responsibility for the first terrorist attack in Saudi Arabia and some of the worst attacks in Pakistan. Christian Science Monitor 11/1/96 18
Middle East, Afghanistan, Pakistan, 81-92 Support for Afghan members of, Ikhwan, a frequently violent Muslim brotherhood. Saddam Hussein of Iraq and Khadafi of Libya also supported more fanatic factions of Afghan Mujahaddin—but largest contributor of Gulbaddin Hekmatyar came from CIA. Huge amounts of U.S. aid also to Ahmed Shah Masood of Rabbani's Jamiat-I-Islami, both longtime advocates of pan-Islam. Lohbeck, K. (1993). Holy War, Unholy Victory 171
Afghanistan, Pakistan, USSR, 80-90 In 1987 the broad percentages of material allocated to the Islamic fundamentalist parties was between 67-73 per cent. Allocations to the parties were: Hekmatyar 18-20 per cent, Rabbani 18-19 per cent, Sayaf 17-18 per cent, Khalis 13-15 per cent, Nabi 13-15 per cent, Gailani 10-11 per cent, and Mujaddadi 3-5 per cent. Mohammad Yousai & Adkin, M. (1992). The Bear Trap: Afghanistan's Untold Story 97,105,215
Afghanistan, Pakistan, 80-93 U.S. created a monster by supporting a rebellion based on religious zealotry. Several of those involved in World Trade Center bombing or plans to attack other targets participated in the Afghan rebellion as recruiters, trainers, or fighters. Abdel Rahman was reportedly a prolific recruiter per reports from Cairo. An Afghan link extends as well to a number of accused terrorists in Egypt, Algeria, and other Arab countries. Through Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence organization (ISI), CIA provided weapons, money and training for Afghan insurgents. Dispute over giving Stinger missiles. Morton Abramowitz, Director of the State Department's INR, now president of the Carneige Endowment for International Peace, was the leading advocate for supplying Stingers. CIA now seeking $55 million to purchase missiles that showing up on black market. Pakistan's ISI favored Hekmatyar—Pakistan agent for years—he now is prime minister of Afghanistan. Peshawar was center for insurgency/extremists and now they looking for new targets—such as the pro-West government in Egypt. Washington Times 7/26/93 a1,13
Afghanistan, 79-90 Mohammad Yousaf & Adkin, M. (1992). The Bear Trap: Afghanistan's Untold Story. London, England: Leo Cooper. The book outlines CIA's support operation for the Mujaheddin in Afghanistan via Pakistan's Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI), Pakistan's CIA. ISI funneled 70 per cent of all material aid—money, uniforms, weapons, including Stinger missiles, and demolitions—to radical Islamic fundamentalists. Now radical Islamic fundamentalism is our major problem. CIABASE report, Crisis of Democracy. 5/1/95
Afghanistan, Pakistan, 80-94 Covert CIA program to buy back U.S. Stinger missiles distributed to rebel forces in 80s plagued by failures, miscalculations and wasted money. Congress authorized more than $65 million for op over last 3 years. Despite the millions, CIA has recovered only a fraction and does not know who controls remaining weapons. Missiles supplied by CIA have turned up in Iran, Qatar and North Korea. Op turned into a fish market “CIA unable to recover most of the missiles.” One effort failed when Pakistani officials stormed into Afghanistan and seized the missiles—Afghan rebel chief so incensed his men kidnapped 2 (Chinese) engineers working with the Pakistani government and holds them for ransom. Foul-ups legendary in intelligence circles in Pakistan and tribal leaders in Afghanistan. Washington Post 3/7/94 a1,14
Afghanistan, Pakistan, 86 In March 86 U.S. began giving Stinger missiles to the Mujaheddin. Shift occurred after activists in Pentagon, and CIA backed by conservative senators, overcame opposition. Opponents argued that introducing U.S.-made arms into third world conflicts would escalate into U.S.-USSR conflicts and there no guarantee advanced weapons would not fall into terrorist hands. British Blowpipes also used. Washington Post 7/23/86 a1,12
Afghanistan, 90 Afghan guerrillas veto drive for Kabul. Pakistan's Inter-Services intelligence agency (ISI) preparing for offensive on Kabul to be led by Gulbaddin Hekmatar, a radical Moslem fundamentalist. ISI controls distribution of CIA and Saudi-supplied weapons. Aborted offensive reveals difference between CIA and the Department of State. State argued against assault, CIA officers urged the assault. Washington Post 11/4/90 a27,28
Afghanistan, Pakistan 80-90 Two part article based on information from intelligence officials: Pakistani General Mohammed Yousaf who wrote book “The Bear Trap;” and more than a dozen senior western officials. Three training camps near Afghan border where Mujaheddin fire heavy weapons and learn to make bombs with CIA-supplied plastic explosives. DCI Casey in 84, during visit convinced Pakistanis to ship propaganda through Afghanistan to USSR Muslim southern republics. CIA supplied thousands of Korans, as well as books on USSR atrocities. U.S. “chickened-out” on taking Afghan war into Soviet soil but Casey ruthless. Intel coup triggered decision to escalate. U.S. received highly specific, sensitive info re USSR war plans in Afghanistan. 3/85 NSDD 166, sharply escalated U.S. op by providing high technology military expertise. In 85 CIA gave extensive satellite reconnaissance data, plans for military ops based on satellite intelligence, intercepts of USSR communications, nets for rebels, delayed timing devices for tons of plastic explosives for urban sabotage, long-range sniper rifles, a targeting device for mortars linked to U.S. navy satellite, wire-guided anti-tank missiles, and Stinger missiles, etc. Washington Post 7/19/92 a1,6
Afghanistan, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, China, USSR, 80-90 first years of the Reagan Administration, covert Afghan war handled out of (DCI) Casey's back pocket. By 85 U.S. increase in U.S. arms supplies—rose to 65,000 tons annually by 87 as well as a ceaseless stream of CIA and P Pentagon specialists to ISI Headquarters near Rawalpindi who helped plan ops by as many as 11 ISI teams trained and supplied by CIA who accompanied Mujaheddin across border. Teams attacked airports, railroads, fuel depots, electricity pylons, bridges and roads. Washington Post 7/19/92 a1,6
Pakistan, Afghanistan, 81-92 A basic course on Who's Who of Mujahaddin. Lohbeck, K. (1993). Holy War, Unholy Victory 6-4
Afghanistan, Germany, 86 A Kuwaitian is trained in explosives, gets false Afghanistan papers made by the CIA in the Frankfurt Headquarters (Dept. of Army Detachment), is flown to Pakistan, goes from there to Afghanistan. Der Speigel 10/6/86.
Afghanistan, 79-90 Mujaheddin commanders inside Afghanistan control huge fields of opium poppies and reap harvest of as much as four million pounds of opium a year. By 89 Afghanistan and Pakistan produced as much heroin as rest of world combined. Weiner, T. (1990). Blank Check: The Pentagon's Black Budget 151-152
Afghanistan, 82 Sales of opium fund Afghan rebels. The DEA said 52% of the heroin brought into the U.S. last year is believed to have come from the area of Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran. U.S. policy contradictory it wants to fight the drug traffic and to drive the USSR out of Afghanistan. 250 to 300 tons opium were produced in Afghanistan in 1981 . That quantity could be converted into 25 to 30 tons of heroin. Processing done in Pakistan. Drug traffickers in U.S. import 4 to 4 1/2 tons of heroin a year. Washington Post 12/17/83
Afghanistan, 86 a Department of State report describes Afghanistan and the bordering tribal areas of Pakistan as “the world's leading source of illicit heroin exports to the US and Europe. The sale of this opium plays an important part in the finances of the CIA-backed Afghan rebels. New York Times 6/20/86 from Intel Parapolitics 9/86 p7
Afghanistan, 89 The Administration is dickering over how best to arm the Mujahedeen. Areas controlled by them include some of the most fertile centers of opium production. DOS report circa 3/89 said Afghanistan produced 700 to 800 metric tons of opium 88, most from territory held by rebels. Representative Bill McCollum hit CIA over handling of mujahedeen and working through Pakistan's intelligence service. The Nation 10/16/89 412
Afghanistan, Iran, Pakistan. (Golden Crescent) accounts for 75% all heroin in U.S. In 1983 4.5 tons heroin came to the U.S. from the Golden Crescent. Covert Action Information Bulletin (now Covert Action Quarterly) Summer 87 11
Afghanistan, Pakistan, 80-90 17 DEA agents assigned to the U.S. embassy in Islamabad. DEA reports identified 40 significant narcotics syndicates in Pakistan. Despite high quality of DEA intelligence, not a major syndicate investigated by Pakistani police in a decade. Hekmatyar himself controlled six heroin refineries. Without fear of arrest heroin dealers began exporting product to Europe and America, capturing more than 50% of both markets. When Pakistani police picked up Hamid Hasnain, V.P. of gvt's Habib bank, they found in his briefcase the personal records of president Zia. Blatant official corruption continued until General Zia's death in an air crash. Typical of misinformation that blocked any U.S. action against Pakistan's heroin trade, the State Department's semi-annual narcotics review in September called General Zia a strong supporter of anti-narcotics activities in Pakistan. McCoy, A.W. (1991). The Politics Of Heroin: CIA Complicity in the Global Drug Traffic 456
Afghanistan, Pakistan, 85-90 U.S. government avoids investigating drug trade run by Afghan resistance movement. Government has info re heroin deals Gulbaddin Hekmatjar, leader of mujaheddin but takes no action. Barnett Rubin of Yale based on Washington Post story: “people attempting research this connection receive hardly any support. Our relationship with Pakistani military is centerpiece our strategic presence in Southern Asia and even in the Persian Gulf.” Article outlines movement of weapons and drugs via Pakistani ISI and the National Logistic Cell (NLC) entirely owned by Pakistani army. top secret s/a-90 17-18
From about 48-91 CIA involved in drug traffic at 3 levels: 1) coincidental Complicity through covert alliances with groups actively engaged in drugs; 2) support of traffic by covering up for drug lord allies; 3) active engagement in transport of opium and heroin. From Burma's opium traffic in 50s and growth of golden triangle in sea in 60s and 70s U.S. role a catalyst. in 5/80 Dr. David Musto, angry. In late 77 he was on Carter's White House Strategy Council on Drug Abuse. Next two years CIA and other intelligence agencies denied Council access to all classified info on drug traffic. CIA lied about dollar role of drugs. Dr. Joyce Lowinson another Council member in New York Times op-ed criticized policy. Both Musto and Lowinson worried about drugs in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Drug Enforcement Agency investigated surge of drugs from southern Asia. Drug traffic in U.S. in large part due to failure Drug Enforcement Agency's interdiction and CIA's covert ops. CIA ops transformed southern Asia to major supplier of world heroin. By 1988 there an estimated 100 to 200 heroin refineries in the Kyber district alone. Trucks from Pakistani army's logistics with CIA arms often returned loaded with heroin—protected with papers from Pakistan's ISI. Drug Enforcement Agency said there were 40 significant narcotics syndicates in Pakistan. Annual earnings $8 to 10 billion. Progressive 7/91 20-26. From Alfred McCoy's book, Politics Of Heroin: CIA Complicity in Global drug trade, a revised edition to be published in July 1991
Drug Enforcement Agency December 83 says Afghanistan rebels are financing their battle at least partially through sale opium, some of which comes to U.S. in form of heroin. David Melodic, Drug Enforcement Agency's congressional liaison said 52% of heroin brought into U.S. last year believed to have come from area of Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran. American interests Afghanistan contradictory over fighting drug traffic and political goals. Washington Post 12/17/83
Pakistan, Afghanistan, 79-89 The Mujahedden rebels keep their cause going through the sale of opium. Drug Enforcement Agency spokesman said “no less than half of all U.S. heroin came from that area of the world.” Gulbaddin Hekmatyar is responsible for murdering hundreds of dedicated resistance fighters, political workers, and intellectuals. He reportedly was a leading figure in the heroin trade. Details of corruption emerged from U.S. sources only after the Soviets began pulling out of Afghanistan. By 1989, Pakistan had no fewer than 100 heroin labs near the border of Afghanistan. CIA had used a Lebanese-controlled currency firm in Zurich, Shakarchi Trading to channel aid to the Afghan rebels. Marshall, j. (1991). drug Wars 49-52
Southern Asia, 80-90 during 80s CIA ops in Afghanistan transformed South Asia from a self-contained opium zone to major supplier heroin on the world market. Saudi Arabia delivered their aid directly to client guerrilla groups inside Afghanistan, most allied agencies, the CIA included, worked through General Zia's [of Pakistan], Inter Service Intel (ISI). CIA relationship with ISI complex, CIA commanded vast arsenal of funds and high-tech weapons that dwarfed ISI's meager budget. McCoy, A.W. (1991). the Politics Of Heroin: CIA Complicity in the Global Drug Traffic 49
Pakistan-Afghanistan border and Iran, 81 the Golden Crescent area where most heroin coming into U.S. in book “Weltmacht Droge” Austrian journalist Hans Georg Behr shows the connection between aid provided by Western intelligence agencies and increased heroin shipping to West. He spent two weeks with Afghan rebels who smuggling opium to Pakistan. Money exchanged for arms. Counterspy 10/81 29-30
Pakistan, Afghanistan, 84 Bush meets with the leader of Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate and Bush agreed for 3.2 billion in new US aid over and above the 2 billion allocated to the Afghan op. Yet by 1984, according to European police sources, Pakistan was furnishing 70% of the world's supply of high-grade heroin. CIA's arms pipeline to Afghan mujahedeen is organized and coordinated by Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence. The main carrier is the national logistic cell, owned by the Pakistan army, it is the largest transport org in the country. US has 17 officers in Pakistan who work exclusively on narcotics. The DEA contingent includes several CIA officers. CIA has gathered intelligence on narcotics since 75. European police who work with DEA claim that US agents have identified 40 significant narcotics syndicates in Pakistan yet none have been broken up in past ten years. Nation article gives a background paragraph on the history of CIA ops and drug traffic. The Nation 11/14/88 477,492,94-6
Afghanistan, Pakistan, 86-87 CIA supplying counterfeit Afghan money for several years. It acquired an excellent set of plates without a blemish. CIA bills arrive in Pakistan and are sold for full value in Peshawar and Quetta. Jack Anderson, Washington Post 5/4/87
81-92 Afghanistan, Pakistan, 81-92 Because of relationship between DCI Casey and General Acktar, CIA became advisor and supplier of aid to Mujahaddin. CIA personnel in Pakistan, were notoriously unlearned in culture and political atmosphere of Afghans. CIA supported Gulbaddin and Ahmed Ahah Masood at the expense of other Afghans who had a much broader-based constituency. Lohbeck, K. (1993). Holy War, Unholy Victory 163
Afghanistan, 76-89 A criticism of the CIA's handling of the op in Afghanistan by Bill McCollum, Republican congressman from Florida and chairman of a GOP task force on terrorism and unconventional warfare. After 10 years and nearly $2 billion in American aid culminating in a monumentally incompetent program of arms procurement and distribution. Hekmatyar's party—recipient of much of much of the aid—implicated in dozens of disappearances and outright murders of rival commanders and Afghan intellectuals. Hekmatyar loyal to Pakistan's ISI that acts as a proxy for CIA. Washington Post 9/10/89 c-1,4
USSR, Pakistan, Afghanistan, 82-87 DCI Casey renewed acquaintance with General Acktar Abdul Rahman Khan. During tenure Casey made 6 trips to coordinate with Acktar. Casey considered himself commander-in-chief against USSR in Afghan. Within 2 years after 1st visit, CIA station in Islamabad became largest in world outside of Langley Headquarters. Lohbeck, K. (1993). Holy War, Unholy Victory 52
Afghanistan, Pakistan, 81-92 Reed Irvine of Committee for a Free Afghanistan, and Andy Eiva, started a letterhead org called Afghan-American Federation. Federation helpful in finding doctors and hospitals that would take severely wounded. Committee also hired people to advise the Mujahaddin military. One was Ted Mataksis who also advised re Central America and Cambodian rebels. Lohbeck, K. (1993). Holy War, Unholy Victory
Afghanistan, Pakistan, USSR, 60-90 ISI's Headquarters in a large camp of 70-80 acres north of Rawalpindi, 12 kilometers from Islamabad. Inside high walls were offices, transit warehouse through which passed 70 percent of all arms and ammo for the Mujahideen, at least 300 vehicles, several acres of training area, a psywar unit, barracks, messhalls and the Stinger training school. This called Ojhri camp. General Akhtar set up another organization for the provision of clothing and rations purchased in huge quantities throughout Pakistan, with CIA money. Major contribution from CIA to Afghan war was satellite intelligence through photographs. Mohammad Yousai & Adkin, M. (1992). the Bear Trap: Afghanistan's Untold Story 27,29, 93
Afghanistan, Pakistan, USSR, 80-90 There were seven Afghan resistance parties formed into an alliance. Political heads of each party called a leader to distinguish from the Mujahideen military commanders. Alliance established after 83. until the Quetta incident, commanders usually received supplies directly from ISI. Supplies then channeled through the parties. Gulbadin Hekmatyar is the youngest and toughest of alliance leaders. Mohammad Yousai & Adkin, M. (1992). the Bear Trap: Afghanistan's Untold Story 40-1
Afghanistan, Pakistan, 85-92 Islamic fundamentalist Gulbaddin Hekmatyar per General Yousaf by 87 received only about 20% of annual allocations of money and weapons. All 4 fundamentalist parties combined received 75%, leaving small amounts for the three moderate parties. U.S. covert program in Afghanistan effectively ended 1/1/92. Program a success. Washington Post 7/20/92 a1,12
Afghanistan, Pakistan, USSR, 80-90 A discussion of the weapons and equipment pipeline. It in three distinct parts with the CIA owning the first part, the purchase and transport of weapons to Pakistan. Second part ISI's responsibility—getting everything carried across Pakistan, allocated to, and handed over to the parties at their Headquarters near Peshawar and Quetta. The third leg was the parties allocated weapons to their commanders and distributed inside Afghanistan. On 1987 the broad percentages allocated to the parties were Hekmatyar 18-20 percent, Rabbani 18-19 per cent, Sayaf 17-18 per cent, Khalis 13-15 percent, Nabi 13-15 percent, Gailani 10-11 percent, and Mujaddadi 3-5 percent. Fundamentalists received a total of 67-73 percent. Mohammad Yousai & Adkin, M. (1992). The Bear Trap: Afghanistan's Untold Story 97, 105 |
I wonder if one day that, you'll say that, you care
If you say you love me madly, I'll gladly, be there
Like a puppet on a string
Love is just like a merry-go-round
With all the fun in the air
One day I'm feeling down on the ground
Then I'm up in the air
Are you leading me on?
Tomorrow will you be gone?
I wonder if one day that, you'll say that, you care
If you love me madly, I'll gladly, be there
Like a puppet on a string
I may win on the roundabout
Then I'll lose on the swings
In or out, there is never a doubt
Just who's pulling the strings
I'm all tied up to you
But where's it leading me to?
I wonder if one day that, you'll say that, you care
If you say you love me madly, I'll gladly, be there
Like a puppet on a string
I wonder if one day that, you'll say that, you care
If you say you love me madly, I'll gladly, be there
Like a puppet on a string
Like a puppet on a..... string |
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| ted_bloody_maul Great Old One Joined: 23 May 2003 Total posts: 4877 Location: Quester's Psykick Dancehall Gender: Unknown |
| Posted: 27-05-2007 02:35 Post subject: |
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| As pointed out on several occasions in those articles, however, the CIA were effectively working blind through the ISI. The idea that this means they created Al-Qaeda, let alone creating it so it could later be controlled like a puppet on a string, is well wide of the mark. |
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| Pietro_Mercurios Heuristically Challenged
Gender: Unknown |
| Posted: 27-05-2007 02:53 Post subject: |
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| ted_bloody_maul wrote: | | As pointed out on several occasions in those articles, however, the CIA were effectively working blind through the ISI. The idea that this means they created Al-Qaeda, let alone creating it so it could later be controlled like a puppet on a string, is well wide of the mark. |
Did I wake you up, Ted_Bloody_Maul?
All that money, all that heavy armament, all the covert ops training, yet the CIA, or that sub-group within the organisation most heavily involved, have absolutely no idea what's really going on, yet they put their blind trust in foreign agents and agencies, to act on their behalf...
With no idea who's telling the truth, or what's true, or real, we live in a World in which Conspiracies don't occur and when they do, they are only instigated by foreigners.
Apparently.  |
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